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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most overworked and misleading statements invoked
in the field of contract law is that mutuality of obligation is an
absolute sine qua non for a binding contract. It has an appeal second
only to the elusive and shadowy "meeting of the minds" standard. It
is "a fundamental principle of contracts," so it is frequently and
dogmatically asserted, "that both parties must be bound or neither
is bound."' Much of the attraction surrounding this statement is
semantical. The word mutuality connotes fairness, equality, and an
assurance of reciprocity of right and of duty.2 Yet in common with
many abstractions, much of the symmetry and internal consistency of
mutuality of obligation is lost when the phrase is applied to the con-
crete. It might be argued that so much vitality is lost in the attrition
of applying principle to reality that the rule becomes useless-and
more importantly-a source of confusion.
It is the purpose of this artide to ascertain and analyze the role
that mutuality of obligation has played in shaping the decision
making process of Ohio courts. The cases will of course serve as
the focus for the study. First, however, it is necessary to examine
the origins of the term and the explanations for its existence.
II. WHY IS MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION NECESSARY?
Mutuality of obligation (hereafter referred to simply as mutu-
ality) is a by-product of the stresses and tensions that have been a
part of the evolutionary process of the doctrine of consideration.
More specifically, the term is concerned with the legal effect of
Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve Law School.
1 F. WHIrrNEY, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs 109 (1958) [hereinafter cited as WHrrNEY].
The origin of the rule is usually attributed to Harrison v. Cage, 5 Mod. 411 (1698).
2 It is because of these connotations that the term appears in so many forms.
Corbin notes that:
We have (I) mutuality of assent, widely asserted as a requirement, but actually
often disregarded; (2) mutuality of consideration, although if only one promise
is made we need to search for only one consideration; (3) mutuality of remedy,
many times given as a requirement for granting the remedy of specific enforce-
ment, but with so many exceptions that they occupy substantially the whole
field; (4) mutuality of obligation.
IA A. CoRmN, CONTRACTs § 152 at 3 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
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promises exchanged in forming a bilateral contract. There are three
promissory possibilities that have produced mutuality analysis. First,
the promises seemingly meet the usual requirements of valid con-
sideration, but one promise is not legally obligatory. Second, there
is no express return promise by the offeree, but one can be implied
from objective manifestations.3 Third, one of the promises might
not, in a legal sense, be a promise at all, i.e., the illusory promise
situation. 4 As a matter of strict definition, however, the doctrine of
mutuality is applicable only to the first possibility. It would un-
questionably be desirable to restrict discussion to mutuality as it
occurs in the "correct" or definitive sense of the term. Such an ap-
proach is not possible; the very vagueness of the doctrine and the
varied case situations that have elicited its application dictate a
wider style of inquiry.
Critical analysis of mutuality has been dominated by the expres-
sions of the two giants of contract law-Samuel Williston and Arthur
Corbin. Each takes a different view of the problem and, as might
be expected, each has engendered case law support. Both positions
will be examined as a prelude to ascertaining the posture of Ohio law.
A. Williston
Much of the confusion surrounding mutuality is attributable
to the historical difficulty of relating the detriment-benefit standards
of consideration to the bilateral contract. It was early discerned that
giving legal effect to the exchange of mutual promises did not square
with detriment or benefit as these terms were used to justify the en-
forcement of unilateral contracts.5 Promises, being totally abstracted
3 The classic statement on promises by implication was uttered by Cardozo while
serving on the Court of Appeals of New York.
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word
was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view
today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct
with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed. If that is so, there is a contract.
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
4 There is a fourth possibility; mutuality has been
held to involve the requirement that the undertaking of the promise relied
upon as a consideration must be reasonably commensurate with, or equivalent
to, the undertaking of the promise which it supports, before it can constitute
a sufficient consideration-a kind of doctrine of mutuality of undertaking.
G. GRISMoRE, CONTRACTS § 69 at 112 (Murray ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as GmsaroRE].
5 The essence of this test of consideration in the unilateral contract is that "what
is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise shall constitute a benefit to
the promisor or a detriment to the promisee." L. SrrPsoN, CONmRACrS 81 (2d ed. 1965)
hereinafter cited as SimPsON]. Detriment and benefit have been absorbed into the
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from concrete obligatory commitment, simply could not be construed
as constituting detriment.6 As Sir Frederick Pollock queried, "What
logical justification is there for holding mutual promises good con-
sideration for each other?" 7
Williston endeavored to resolve this conundrum by first posit-
ing that the offeror has the option of either requesting a promise in
fact or an obligation at law. The latter possibility he discarded. "An
offeror contemplating the formation of a bilateral contract says
nothing of obligations, and asks only a promise in fact."8 It is, there-
fore, the mutual exchange of promises in fact that Williston con-
sidered to be the point of departure for defining consideration. But
the problem remains. Why is consideration status imputed into some
promises in fact and denied others? The answer is that if the promise
in fact represents an act or something of value that would in its own
right be consideration and would (or apparently may be) forthcom-
ing, it constitutes consideration. Or more specifically:
Mutual promises each of which assures some act or forbearance
that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to the promisor
or beneficial to the promisee, and neither of which is rendered
void by any rule of law other than that relating to consideration,
are sufficient consideration for one another.9
Williston thus firmly embraced the doctrine of mutuality of
obligation. Both promises must assure performance of something
of potential value. And "a promise will be of no value unless it is
broader "bargain" test. See RFSTATEmENT OF CONTRACrS § 75 (1932). See generally R.
PoUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW ch. 6 (1954).
6 Langdell argued that if the promisor promised to pay $100 for the promisee's
automobile and the promisee promised to sell the automobile for $100, the considera-
tion for the promisee's promise can be found in the fact that the promisor incurred a
detriment in obligating himself to pay the $100. Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Con-
sideration for Each Other, 14 HARv. L. REv. 496 (1900). This view was never accepted.
"To find the required detriment that makes a consideration in the legal obligation
which results from the presence of consideration is to reason in a circle." GusmoRa,
supra note 4, at 83. Ames contended that it was the making of the promises alone that
furnished consideration. Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HAv. L. REv.
515 (1898).
7 28 LAw Q. REV. 101 (1912). Pollock continues: "None, it is submitted. But the
contrary doctrine would only have led to cumbrous fictions, and our seventeenth-
century ancestors rightly took the illogical course and said very little about it." Id.
8 Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts, 27 HAgv. L. REv. 503, 506 (1914)
[hereinafter cited as Williston].
9 Id. at 527. Thus Williston went beyond Ames who theorized that it was the
making of the promise, and nothing more, that furnished consideration.
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binding ..... ,,0 But to Williston, mutuality was no more than a
synonym for consideration. "If anything more.., is meant by saying
that mutuality is necessary for the formation of a contract, than by
saying sufficient consideration is necessary for a contract, the state-
ment must be deemed erroneous.""
Williston made no effort to accommodate the voidable contract.
Any promise performable only at the option of the promisor, such as
the promises of insane persons or infants,12 clearly did not meet the
standards of value envisioned in his definition of consideration.
The infant's promise cannot support a counter-promise because it
affords him the opportunity to exercise his option without suffering
a detriment or giving the promisee a benefit. It is, therefore, an
illusory promise. Yet promises of this character do, in the actuality
of case law, support counter-promises, and one party can be bound
while the other party has complete freedom as to whether he will
be bound. The obvious solution to this clash of theory with reality,
and the solution adopted by Williston, is to classify the voidable
contract "as an exception to the principles of consideration.' 1 3
The merger of consideration and mutuality, with the concom-
mitant exemption for voidable contracts, has not been universally
absorbed into contract law by either the cases or by commentators.
Ballantine argued that Williston's approach was defective because
it overlooked the distinction between the voidable promise situation,
such as incapacity, fraud, or statute of frauds, and the case where
one of the parties promises nothing in return. In the latter situation
there is obviously no consideration and hence no mutuality. This is
not true, so Ballantine contended, where a voidable promise is
concerned. 14 By defining consideration as "something of possible
value given or [and this is where Ballantine differed from Williston]
1o Id. at 525.
11 Id.
12 Oliphant noted seven "exceptions" to mutuality.
Among such cases are those in which one party: (1) is an infant, (2) is insane,
(3) has been guilty of fraud, (4) of duress, (5) of illegality, (6) is a corporation
acting ultra vires, (7) has not complied with the Statute of Frauds.
Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Contracts, 25 CoLumr. L. Ray. 705,
706 (1925).
13 Williston, suPra note 8, at 528.
14 In a voidable promise transaction we have all of the affirmative elements
of a valid contract, but the obligation of one of the parties is affected or
taken away owing to the presence of some defense or negative element which
does not affect the obligation of the other.
Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HAxv. L. R v. 121, 131 (1914).
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undertaken to be given in return for something promised"'15 he was
able to fit voidable promises into mutuality. Thus, in an exchange of
promises between adult and infant, both parties have committed
themselves to mutual undertakings and this commitment is not
erased by the fact that the law, for reasons of policy, makes available
an absolute defense to the infant. Consideration is present "in the
reciprocity or mutuality of the respective undertakings. . ...16
In terms of broad perspective, there is little difference between
Williston and Ballantine. Both related mutuality to consideration.
To Williston, a voidable promise, lacking what he characterized as
"value," was in effect illusory and consequently could not support
a counter-promise. This being the case, a lack of consideration (and
mutuality) could be expected to prevent the existence of an enforce-
able contract. But this did not happen. Promises of infants, insane
persons, promises involving fraud or those promises within the
statute of frauds do, as a matter of fact, support counter-promises.
These promises, according to Williston, are outright exceptions to
rules of consideration. Ballantine, on the other hand, concluded that
voidable promises did meet what he considered to be the definitive
boundaries of consideration. Consideration resides in the reciprocity
of engagement or undertaking and the fact that the law allows one
party an absolute defense cannot erase this form of mutuality.
B. Corbin
Corbin's approach to consideration and mutuality is the anti-
thesis of Williston's. Where Williston endeavors to maintain a sense
of symmetry and unity between abstract principles and case law,
Corbin, ever the pragmatist, looks directly to "the ever-growing
multitude of transactions of men, the flood of decisions by in-
numerable judges, the evolution of our social practices and
mores.. ."1 for guidance. Using these sources as a frame of reference,
Corbin concludes that mutuality simply does not square with the
reality of case law. Courts have recognized and supported too many
contractual relationships where both parties are not reciprocally
bound. He does not, however, deny that the statement of the rule
makes frequent appearances in the working vernacular of jurists,
"made perhaps with nothing but 'illusory' promises in mind."' 8
15 Id. at 132.
10 Id. at 131.
17 1 ColmW, supra note 2, § 142, at 613.
18 Id. at § 146, at 635.
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Corbin also explains the persistence of the doctrine as being at-
tributable to the failure to appreciate the distinction between
mutuality and consideration. For example, where courts are unable
to discover a counter-promise by implication they frequently con-
dude that a lack of mutuality prevents creation of a binding con-
tract. Noting that in such a case even a single obligation is lacking,
Corbin asserts:
It may be a satisfactory reason for holding the defendant's pro-
mise unenforceable that there was no consideration; merely
saying that there was no mutuality is wholly unsatisfactory.19
As the law sanctioned enforcement of transactions in an increas-
ing number of situations in which mutuality of obligation was
obviously absent, so Corbin reasoned, the term lost any relevance
that it might have once possessed. Thus to consider mutuality as a
necessary component of consideration or to give it status as an
independent principle of law is to ignore the dominant and better
reasoning of contemporary courts. Simply stated, "Courts now often
say correctly that it is consideration that is necessary, not mutuality
of obligation." 20
The idea that mutuality is superfluous nomenclature totally
lacking in relevant content has been echoed by Professor Grismore.
His recommendation is every bit as direct and succinct as Corbin's:
mutuality "has outlived any possible period of usefulness." 21 Thus,
he continues, "the time has come when it should be frankly dis-
avowed. ' 22 But, while agreeing in conclusion with Corbin, Grismore's
reasoning was definitely his own. First, he reasoned that mutuality's
obsolescence can be explained by its causative forces. Mutuality is a
relic of pre-constructive condition decisions. When one promisor to
a bilateral contract could demand performance without a reciprocal
performance on his part, mutuality of obligation was a very necessary
form of protection. However, the appearance of the doctrine of
constructive conditions, which protected both parties as to their
respective rights of performance, rendered the concept of mutuality
19 1A CORBIN § 152, at 10-11.
20 Id. at 5. Corbin had at one time been hesitant about abandoning mutuality.
The present writer is not yet ready to abandon ... [mutuality] altogether; but
he is thoroughly convinced that its correctness as a rule of law cannot be estab-
lished by any mere deductive process based upon some more ancient and
general rule of law.
Corbin, Non-Binding Promises as Consideration, 26 COLUmn. L. Rav. 550 (1926).
21 GmsMORa, supra note 4, § 69 at 116.
22 Id.
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barren of practical value. Consequently there is no longer any
justification for dogmatically holding that any non-enforceable
promise constitutes insufficient consideration. It logically follows
then, and this is the second point in Grismore's analysis, that some
non-binding promises-the infant's promise for example-can have
value2 3 and can constitute consideration. The critical issue, therefore,
is one of the presence of consideration-not mutuality.2 4
As the above survey indicates, mutuality presents unique prob-
lems of analysis. When legal rules precipitate controversy, it is usually
over the application of an established and well defined rule to a
formerly untouched fact situation. This is not the case where
mutuality is at issue. Controversy begins with the definition to be
assigned mutuality and, assuming, but not conceding, resolution of
this hurdle, continues on to the conflict over the degree of recogni-
tion to be given the concept in contract analysis. Considering this
background it is easy to understand why Ohio courts have not had
an easy time with mutuality.
III. MUTUALITY AND UNILATERAL CONTRACTS
IN THE OHIO COURTS
The embroglio that can be generated by an automatic and me-
chanical invocation of mutuality is graphically reflected by the en-
deavors of Ohio courts to use the doctrine to justify the creation of
unilateral contracts. As a matter of correct definition, mutuality of
obligation and the unilateral contract are mutually exclusive.25
When the unilateral offer is made, obviously no reciprocal obligation
exists on the offeree's part. Once the requested performance is ren-
23 If the person promising has undertaken to set some objective limits to his
future freedom of action, there is ground for saying that his promise has value,
even though that promise is not legally enforceable. This is in fact the test of
value which the law seems to adopt for this purpose ....
Id. at 115.
24 For additional discussion on mutuality see SIAMSON, supra note 5, § 55 at 91-95;
WHITNEY, supra note 1, § 49 at 109-15. Both Simpson and Whitney equate consideration
with mutuality; neither advocates abandonment of the doctrine. The view of the
RrEsATnMNT OF CONTRACTS is evasive: "The statement often made that unless both
parties are bound neither is bound is quite erroneous, as a universal statement."
(emphasis supplied) RRSTATEmENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 12, Comment b (1932).
25 As a matter of fact, reliance on mutuality of obligation almost resulted in the
demise of the unilateral contract. "So appealing has been . . . [mutuality] that the
term 'unilateral contracts,' seeming to be its opposite, almost came to mean a one-sided
unenforceable promise. A valid contract had to be 'mutual'; if not mutual, it was
'unilateral' and void." IA CORBIN, supra note 2, § 152 at 3.
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dered by the offeree, only one obligation remains-the obligation
of the offerer to render his performance. Thus, as Professor Whitney
points out, "In a unilateral contract there is never a moment of time
when both parties are bound to do something. ' 26 These definitional
restrictions have not, however, prevented Ohio courts from reading
mutuality into unilateral contract analysis. The following remark,
from a per curiam Ohio Supreme Court decision is typical: "Standing
unaccepted, the offer [for a unilateral contract] was but a unilateral
promise, lacking in consideration and in mutuality....,,27
There are two possible explanations for this line of reasoning.
It will be remembered that Williston theorized that consideration
sufficient to support a counter-promise existed if what was promised
would, when performed, constitute consideration in its own right.28
A present promise hence was viewed in terms of the effects and
quality of future performance. Ohio courts invoke an "after the fact"
version of this analysis. The doing of a requested act supplies the
requisite consideration and in doing so corporealizes an unmade
reciprocal promise by the offeree. The courts, in weaving mutuality
into the reality of the unilateral contract, implicitly assume that the
performance relates back to an unspoken promise that, if it had been
uttered, would have constituted sufficient value (consideration), and
thereby form a basis for mutuality of obligation.
In relating performance back to a hypothetical promise for the
sake of mutuality, the courts have on several occasions concluded
that no promise can be implied. Hence no mutuality. For example,
one Adam Coy promised to construct or pay for the construction
of a turnpike in exchange for shares of stock in the turnpike com-
pany and a commitment that the road would cross his land in a
designated area. 29 The plaintiffs completed the turnpike up to Mr.
Coy's farm and then tendered the stock, which he refused to accept.
The turnpike company argued that the mutuality defense was
avoided because of their performance in tendering the shares and
because they had built the road up to the boundaries of the de-
fendant's land. This the court refused to accept. Instead they en-
26 WHITNEY, sutpra note 1, § 49 at 110.
27 Bretz v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 171, 175, 16 N.Ef.d 272, 274
(1938).
28 The origin of this approach to consideration is Lord Holt's dictum that ".
where the doing a thing will be a good consideration, a promise to do that thing will
be so too .. ." Thorp v. Thorp, 12 Mod. 455, 459, 88 Eng. Rep. 1448, 1450 (K.B. 1702).
See generally Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUm. L. REV. 799, 816-18 (1941).
29 Dayton, Watervleit Valley and Xenia Turnpike Co. v. Coy, 13 Ohio St. 84 (1861).
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deavored to ascertain whether performance by the turnpike company
suggested a promise on their part and if this promise, implicit or
express, could be said to have been mutual and concurrent with the
defendant's promise. Inquiry into the record revealed that at the
instant Coy made his promise, there was no reciprocal commitment
by the plaintiff. And the subsequent performance did not indicate
that such a promise on the part of the plaintiff could be implied.80
There was, therefore, a lack of mutuality.
Twenty years later the Ohio Supreme Court engaged in a
similar search in Andrews v. Campbell.31 One year after the de-
fendant issued a promissory note he allegedly agreed to pay 10%
interest on the note if the plaintiff's intestate would extend the time
of payment. The time of payment was, in fact, extended. On the
basis of this, the plaintiff argued that "the contract became ... an
executed one.. ."32 which had the effect of erasing lack of mutuality
and making the defendant's promise to pay the 10% interest rate
binding. The court, as in the Coy case, acknowledged the fact of
a form of performance-time was extended-but they then con-
cluded that his performance could not be related to, nor did it
engender, a supporting promise. ".... [I]t does not appear that the
act of giving time by White [the plaintiff's intestate] was in execution
of any contract with Campbell, or of any terms or conditions, express
or implied, as the consideration for his promise." 33
The second explanation for the proclivity of Ohio courts to
weave mutuality into the unilateral contract reflects the not infre-
quent situation where there is an "exchange" of promises but one
promise does not constitute sufficient consideration. However, sub-
sequent performance of this non-binding promise repairs the defect
and converts what would have been a "void" bilateral contract into
30 Without something more than the act of locating the road across the farm
of the defendant, it would be impossible for the defendant to show that it
constituted an agreement on the part of the turnpike company. Had the stock
on the completion of the road advanced to above its par value, and the de-
fendant been desirous to procure stock equal to the amount of the estimate
for building the part of the road described in the instrument, he certainly
could not sustain his claim by showing the written instrument and the fact
of the location of the road. He would be bound to show assent in some other
way, and other evidence of assent being requisite to bind the company, it is
also requisite to bind the defendant.
Id. at 94-95.
31 36 Ohio St. 361 (1881).
32 Id. at 368.
33 Id. at 369.
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an enforceable unilateral contract. Ohio courts, perhaps in a zeal to
justify the unilateral contract, have a tendency to cloak their ex-
planations with mutuality dialogue.
Perhaps the most influential case on this point is Himrod Fur-
nace Co. v. Cleveland and Mahoning R.R. Co.84 The defendant
railroad, at the plaintiff's suggestion, agreed to transport all of the
pig iron manufactured by furnaces that were to be erected by the
plaintiff. The offer was thus contingent upon the erection of the
furnaces. Using this fact as a basis, the Railroad argued that since
the plaintiff was under no obligation to fulfill the terms of his
promise (i.e. erection of the furnaces) their own promise "was naked
-without consideration," 35 resulting in a lack of mutuality. The
court acknowledged that there was no mutuality prior to the erec-
tion of the furnaces. But immediately upon performance by the
plaintiff, mutuality descended over the transaction. In effect mutu-
ality was defined as executed consideration. Hence even though the
plaintiff was not bound originally, his giving executed consideration
supplied mutuality.386
There is no question as to the validity of the unilateral contract
in Himrod. But criticism can be directed towards the injection of
mutuality into the analysis. Admittedly, an ostensible compatibility
between the doctrine of mutuality and the unilateral contract is
maintained. But the price for symmetry, and a specious symmetry at
that, is too high. As Corbin observes: "While the result reached in
these cases is sound, such a method of rationalizing it merely per-
petuates confusion of thought.' 13 7
In Ohio, the confusion of thought engendered by Himrod was
to have a deleterious effect on decisional reasoning twenty years later
in Herrick v. Wardwell.38 The Cleveland Dairy and Transportation
Company entered into contracts with local milk producers which
34 22 Ohio St. 451 (1872).
35 Id. at 457.
38 It matters not, in our judgment, whether Kimball and associates were or
were not bound to defendant to erect a furnace according to the condition of
the agreement; for having done so at the request of defendant, and relying
on the faith of its promise, they have a right to insist upon performance on
its part. Nor does it matter whether Kimball and associates were bound to
deliver freight to the defendant, as they have executed the consideration for
defendant's promise to carry freights for them at a given rate for a specified
time when requested.
Id. at 460.
37 IA CoRBIN § 152 at 5.
38 58 Ohio St. 294, 50 N.. 903 (1898).
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contained the following terms: the milk producer agreed to sell to
the Company "all the milk produced by him, and amounting to 20
gallons or more per day for a period of one year... ."9 The Com-
pany agreed to pay a specified sum of money per gallon. Milk was
delivered until an assignment for the benefit of the Company's credi-
tors was made; at that time, nearly thirteen hundred dollars was
owed the milk producers for milk already delivered.
The defendant Cleveland Dairy's defense was premised on the
argument that the milk producers were not bound to produce and
deliver any milk, and if the producers were not bound, neither was
the defendant. On a superficial level the defendant's argument was
correct; the milk producers could avoid any obligation to produce.
Yet closer analysis of the promise indicates that it will support a
counterpromise. The agreements were output contracts: the milk
producers were committed to selling their total production ("amount-
ing to 20 gallons or more per day") to the Dairy Company. And it
is universally recognized that in the exchange of such promises, suf-
ficient consideration is present to make the contract binding. As
Corbin reasons: even though
the promisor retains the privilege of closing down the works
and of producing and delivering nothing, he has given a suffi-
cient consideration in promising to sell his entire output, what-
ever it may be, to the promisee and none to others.40
The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the basic thrust of the de-
fendant's argument. At the time the agreement was entered into,
there was, so they concluded, no consideration and no mutuality.
But, the court reasoned, this deficiency was cured by performance
which resulted in the formation of a unilateral contract with mutu-
ality of obligation. "... .[W]hen milk was produced and shipped, the
obligation of the corporation to pay for it was binding, and the con-
tract between the parties was then both definite and mutual" (em-
phasis supplied).41
The path followed by the court in reaching what is clearly a
correct conclusion invites criticism. In endeavoring to meet the
defendant's argument head-on, the court needlessly embarked on a
search for mutuality. And once the search was undertaken, it was
necessary to restructure the entire transaction. The existence of an
enforceable bilateral output contract was disregarded because it was
39 Id. at 296, 50 N.E. at 903.
40 1A CORBIN § 158 at 56-57.
41 58 Ohio St. at 308, 50 N.E. at 905.
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thought that mutuality was absent. Then, to satisfy an assumed
mutuality requirement, it was necessary to focus on the plaintiff's
completed performance, which supplied the basis for the conclusion
that a unilateral contract had been created; a unilateral contract
with mutuality. Unfortunately, as noted above, mutuality of obliga-
tion and the unilateral contract are not compatible.42
IV. MUTUALITY AND CONSIDERATION AS ANALYZED
BY THE OHIO COURTS
With one notable exception, 43 which will be discussed later,
Ohio courts have embraced Williston's view that mutuality and con-
sideration are synonymous. This view is firmly entrenched in con-
tract stare decisis--dating at least as far back as the 1861 Coy decision.
In structuring justification for endeavoring to ascertain the existence
of an implied promise the court laid down a perspective of inter-
changeability that persists today. "Every contract consists of a request
on one side, and an assent on the other. '44 And, to the court, "These
are the terms of mutuality: if either are absent, there is no con-
tract."
45
Treating consideration and mutuality as synonymous should
have resulted in the gradual dissipation of discussions concerning
mutuality. The pressures of developing consistent principles of con-
sideration would presumably efface a concept so peripheral as
mutuality. This has not occurred. Where, as in Mutual Home &
Savings Ass'n v. Welker,46 the court could easily have confined its
42 For other cases in which mutuality has been invoked as an element of the
unilateral contract see: Brown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N.E. 76 (1902); Hassenzahl
v. Bevins, 2 Ohio C.C.R. (ns.) 496 (Ct. of App. 1902); Macy Corp. v. Ramey, 75 Ohio L.
Abs. 334 (C.P. 1957). Mutuality has even been injected into the unilateral contract on
an estoppel theory. Where the plaintiff extended a continuing offer under which the
defendant could accept by performing specified acts, it was held that:
Where a contract is invalid for want of mutuality, and where the party
asserting the invalidity has received benefits thereunder .... such party will
be estopped from refusing performance on the ground that said contract was
not originally binding on the other party who has performed.
Penna. R.R. Co. v. N.O.T. & L. Co., 4 Ohio L. Abs. 702 (Ct. App. 1926).
43 Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939), noted
in 13 U. CIN. L. Rav. 586 (1939). See also Austin, Mutuality of Remedy in Ohio: A
Journey from Abstraction to Particularism, 28 Onio ST. L.J. 629 at 63841 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as AUSTIN].
44 Dayton, Watervliet Valley and Xenia Turnpike Co. v. Coy, 13 Ohio St. 84, 92
(1861) (quoting Jackson v. Galloway, 5 Bing N.C. 75).
45 Id. (quoting Sr~rH ON CONTRACTS 88, note).
46 35 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 42 N.E.2d 167 (Ct. of App. 1941).
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analysis to the sufficiency and to the existence of consideration, mu-
tuality was introduced as the clinching argument. The defendant
issued a fifty-three hundred dollar promissory note, accompanied
by a mortgage, to the plaintiff Savings Association. Subsequently the
defendant agreed to pay off the obligation by purchasing stock in
the plaintiff association. The stock was to be credited against the
note at the face value of the shares. Because the market value of the
stock was considerably below its face value the defendant endeavored
to erase the obligation with tender of two thousand dollars which
would have been sufficient to buy up enough of the depreciated stock
to settle the account.
The issue was crystal clear; all the court had to do was to focus
its inquiry on the existence of consideration. Moreover, the perim-
eter of inquiry was not expansive nor burdensome. The question
before the court was did the defendant debtor's promise constitute
legal detriment to him or confer a legal benefit on the creditor?
Stated differently, where a liquidated debt is involved, does a prom-
ise to pay a lesser sum constitute consideration? After concluding, as
the court did, that the defendant's promise did not measure up to
the standards imposed by the incrustations of prior decisions, inquiry
should have ended. Analysis was, however, prolonged so as to give
the decision the added color of mutuality. It was during this process
of endeavoring to create what was assumed to be internal harmony
of reasoning that the futility of maintaining consideration and
mutuality as interchangeable concepts became apparent. Words in-
tended to be synonymous were separated in application into parallel
rules. In the Mutual case an equation appeared: consideration plus
mutuality equals enforceable contract. "If there was no considera-
tion for the contract there could be no mutuality, nor could such
contract be enforced." 47 This, of course, goes beyond Williston's view
of the interchangeability of consideration and mutuality.
V. Ti RELEVANCY OF MUTUALIrrY OF OBLIGATION
TO "ILLUSORY" PROMISES
The elasticity and range of mutuality, plus its confusion gen-
erative capacity, are conspicuous where the existence of an illusory
promise is at issue. When a promisor makes a promise in which the
performance is completely within his control and at his option it
is called "illusory." As far as contract doctrine is concerned, an il-
47 Id. at 569, 42 N.E.2d at 170. See also Doan v. Rogan, 79 Ohio St. 372, 87 N.E.
263 (1909).
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lusory promise is a term descriptive of what is, in effect, no promise.43
This means that a discussion of consideration and certainly of mu-
tuality is irrelevant; the core of the problem is the level of commit-
ment contained in the promise under scrutiny. The determination
of whether a promise is, or is not, illusory can be quite difficult,
calling into play the esoterica of contract dialectic. 49 The complexity
of the problem is magnified in those situations where the promisor
bargains for an illusory promise and gets it, as in Evans v. Peck-
Hammond Co.50
There was little doubt about the defendant's request for a
counter-illusory promise. "We propose to make for you any and all
gray iron castings which you may order of us... "5i The contract
was "to be in force until January 1, 1901, with privilege of renewal
year by year with a readjustment of price .... 52 The defendant thus
agreed to manufacture castings if the plaintiff decided to place an
order. The plaintiff in his return "promise" made no commitment-
he had the option of either making an order or not, but in any case,
the decision was his alone to make. Although the record is not clear
on this point, the plaintiff apparently did submit orders during the
first year and then filed suit when the defendant refused to continue
service.
The defendant's offer for an illusory promise and the plaintiff's
acknowledgment of the offer could not constitute, in terms of con-
sideration, the basis for an enforceable bilateral contract. When,
however, the plaintiff "performed" by actually ordering and prom-
ising to pay for the manufacture of a specific number of castings,
the "illusion" was corporealized into a bilateral contract. A standing
offer to sell had been accepted; the exchange of promises was com-
pleted.53 But at the time of renewal, after one year of performance,
48 An apparent promise which according to its terms makes performance
optional with the promisor whatever may happen, or whatever course of
conduct in other respects he may pursue, is in fact no promise, although
often called an illusory promise.
RSTATEmEN oF CONTRACrS § 2, comment b (1932).
49 See Patterson, "Illusory" Promises and Promisors' Options, SE.cETED READiNGS
ON THE LAw oF CONTRACTS 401 (1931); Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration,
34 YALE L.J. 571 (1925).
50 15 Ohio C. Dec. 161 (1903).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Corbin analyzes this type of situation as follows:
Where a dealer offers to supply on stated terms such quantities of goods as the
offeree may choose to order during the next year and the offeree expresses
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the offer was obviously withdrawn by the defendant. Hence, the
suit concerned an offer for an illusory promise that had been revoked
before the offeree had an opportunity to accept and create a bilateral
contract. Neither consideration nor mutuality was at issue.
Apparently both counsel overlooked the crucial issue. To de-
fendant's counsel an offer was made for a bilateral contract to which
the plaintiff failed to respond with a counter-promise. Consequently
the mutuality doctrine that "a promise is a good consideration for
a promise only where there is a perfect mutuality of engagements so
that each party may enforce the contract against the other," 4 ex-
onerated him from liability. Agreeing that a mutuality obstacle did
exist, the plaintiff endeavored to hurdle it with executed considera-
tion in the form of the furnishing of wood and iron for casting
patterns along with an experienced superintendent.
The court responded to counsels' off-center lack of considera-
tion arguments; they concluded that in fact the plaintiff made no
promise to perform, and that providing a superintendent and pat-
terns was "but an incident, a working detail . . . of the contract"'5
and hence could not be construed as executed consideration. In
addition to the fact that the offer revocation issue was generally
overlooked, the decision can be criticized on two other counts: first,
the use of mutuality as an all embracive term to be invoked when-
ever a consideration argument is raised was perpetuated. It was an-
other instance of mutuality being employed as a device to encompass
whatever might escape other arguments. Secondly, another fact situa-
tion was drawn into the mold of the mutuality doctrine, thereby
expanding the perimeter of potential application. 6 Neither point
can be said to be desirable.
assent thereto, there is no contract because the offeree has made no promise
and has given no other consideration for the dealer's promise. Nevertheless,
the transaction is operative as a standing offer to sell; and if the offeree, before
any revocation, sends in an order for a definite amount of goods, a bilateral
contract for such goods is effected. However 'illusory' his former expression of
assent may be as a promise, his present order is an enforceable promise to buy
and pay for the goods ordered, in accordance with the dealer's communicated
terms.
1 CoRwrN, supra note 2, § 145 at 633.
54 15 Ohio C. Dec. at 164.
U5 Id. at 165.
56 The court did, however, note that: "Before the first year was out the attitude
of both parties was clearly defined on the subject of renewal, one expressly claiming
the right to renew, and the other with equal explicitness repudiating such right...
rd. at 166.
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VI. MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION AND THE OPTION:
AN EXCE.PTION?
It has been noted that some transactions simply do not fit into
the strictures of the mutuality definition. 57 The option, which to
Williston was an outright exception, is a classic example. The fol-
lowing case is typical: the defendants, for one dollar consideration,
gave the Wiedemann Brewing Company "an option of ten days from
this date for the leasing of the building owned by us... ."8 The right
and power, as a matter of law, to accept the lease was thus conveyed
to Wiedemann. On the other hand, the defendants could not have
invoked jural machinery to force Wiedemann to accept the lease.
One party was bound, the other retained freedom of power to make
a commitment.
At cursory glance, this form of option has illusory promise over-
tones. While the defendants are committed to a definite course of
action, the Wiedemann Company has unlimited freedom of decision
as to whether they will take possession of the premises. The differ-
ence, however, between the option contract and the illusory promise
is that in the former situation the promisee, who in this case is
Wiedemann, pays consideration for the right to exercise freedom
of choice.59
Confronted with a clash of mutuality doctrine with the option
arrangement, the Ohio Supreme Court equivocated. Any possible
lack of mutuality was, so the court reasoned, cured when Wiede-
mann exercised its rights to the premises. "[T]he acceptance by the
57 See note 12 supra.
58 George Wiedemarn Brewing Co. v. Maxwell, 78 Ohio St. 54, 55, 84 N.E. 595,
596 (1908).
59 Therefore, one who has given a consideration for a real promise can enforce
that promise, even though he may himself have an unlimited option. His legal
right is not affected by the fact that he has made no promise at all or has made
some illusory promise. Thus, where A promises to convey land to B for $5,000
at any time within 50 days, and in return B pays A $100, A's promise to B is
binding even though B has made no promise at all. This is because B has
actually paid $100, amply sufficient as a consideration. There is nothing illu-
sory about A's promise, although it is conditional on payment of $5,000 within
30 days. A's legal duty is not made dependent on his own will, wish or desire,
but upon the act of payment by B. A has no option whatever. B, on the other
hand, has an unlimited freedom of choice, the option between paying $5,000
and not paying it. B's unlimited option does not invalidate A's promise to B.
This is true of every unilateral contract, whether the promise of which it
consists is conditional or unconditional.
Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE L.J. 571, 576 (1925).
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promisee within the time prescribed supplied lack of mutuality, if
any before existed, and was sufficient to constitute a binding obliga-
tion" (emphasis supplied).6 0 The flaw in this approach is that as
soon as the promisee, Wiedemann, performed, the only obligation
remaining would be that of the promisors; they would be obligated
to relinquish the premises.
Contouring mutuality into executed performance and thereby
creating "mutuality of obligation" came into Ohio case law through
the unilateral contract. The same criticism that was directed toward
the merger of mutuality with the unilateral contract also applies to
the option; at no time is there an exact instant when the obligations
can be said to be mutual. There is, however, one substantial differ-
ence between the two transactions. The right to exercise the option
is cemented by consideration. This distinction has had an impact
on subsequent Ohio decisions, resulting in the option being ex-
pressly carved out as an exception to the doctrine of mutuality.
"Under such contracts," the Ohio Supreme Court said in 1939, "con-
sideration is essential, but mutuality of obligation is not."6' 1
VII. Tmi EROSION OF A DOCTRINE: REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS
Perhaps the most delineative example of the manner in which
the energy of the doctrine of mutuality has been diluted into near
obsolescence is the contemporary interpretation given the require-
ments contract. The broad definition of the arrangement is simple:
the promisor agrees to purchase all of his requirements over a speci-
fied period of time from the promisee. It is a commercial relation-
ship that provides significant economic advantages to both parties.
To the seller, such contracts "may make possible the substantial
reduction of selling expenses, give protection against price fluctua-
tions, and ... offer the possibility of a predictable market." 62 The
buyer is assured a source of supply and protection against price in-
creases, both of which allow him to engage in long run cost planning.
The most serious hurdle that the requirements contract had to
overcome in order to achieve recognition by the courts was mutuality
60 78 Ohio St. at 63, 84 N. at 597. The syllabus reads as follows: "Written agree-
ments known as options are not necessarily void for lack of mutuality, and where
accepted within the time specified may become valid and enforceable contracts." Id.
at 54, 84 N. at 595.
61 Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 519, 21 N.E2d 669, 674
(1939).
62 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-7 (1949).
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of obligation.6 3 Two factors seemed to have generated concern: one,
the promisor was not obliged to have any requirements. He could,
for example, go out of business or he might shift his business to
other product lines. Secondly, if the promisor did go out of business
his duties and obligations were, under the terms of the contract, at
an end. On the other hand, the promisee did not, so it was often
reasoned, enjoy equal freedom. He had to always be ready to meet
the promisor's needs. By analyzing the transaction in these .terms it
is not surprising that courts frequently reached the conclusion that
the promisor's commitment was illusory and that the transaction
lacked mutuality.
As soon as the inquiry focused on consideration, the above line
of reasoning receded and, in some instances, was discarded. Require-
ments contracts are today universally upheld. Because by his promise
he circumscribes his decisional freedom, the buyer has furnished
sufficient consideration to support a counterpromise. There is, in
reality, no illusion in the purchaser's promise since it "contains one
very definite element that specifically limits the promisor's future
liberty of action; he definitely promises that he will buy of no one
else." 64
That mutuality of obligation does not pose an insurmountable
obstacle to the enforcement of requirements contracts has been a
part of Ohio stare decisis since Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co.65
was decided in 1939. The defendant, who operated a fleet of buses,
promised to purchase all of its gas, oil, and grease requirements from
Fuchs at specified prices. The plaintiff, of course, agreed to meet
these terms and, in addition, at the inception of the arrangement
he purchased seventy-five hundred dollars worth of stock in the
defendant's business. The contract was to continue so long as the
plaintiff retained the stock.
The essentials of an enforceable requirements contract were
discernible and fixed. The length of the arrangement was keyed to
the possession of stock, while quantity of supplies was fixed by Motor
Stage's good faith needs predicated on prior experience. The Ohio
Supreme Court's ratiocinatibn was, nevertheless, anything but
smooth. Unquestionably much of the unevenness can be attributed
to the crucial mutuality of remedy issue.66 Developing new doctrine,
63 See Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L Rm.
1, 3-4 (1932).
64 1A CORBBi, supra note 2, § 156 at 33.
65 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E2d 669 (1939).
66 On occasion Ohio courts have merged the totally different concepts of mutuality
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as the court did in the mutuality of remedy area, is never a smooth
or easy process. 07 It is also true, however, that an over reaction to
mutuality of obligation did not ease the burden of this analysis. For
example, it was acknowledged that a requirements contract is not
lacking in mutuality of obligation. Two sentences later consideration
was separated from mutuality: "so long as there is consideration for
the obligation of the defendant, it is not essential that there be
mutuality of obligation .... 68
The unique feature of the case, and undoubtedly the cause of
the separation of mutuality from consideration, was that it was the
promise of the promisee that was alleged to lack the substance
necessary to generate mutuality. As noted, it is usually argued that it
is the promisor-buyer who has made an illusory commitment. Fuchs'
right to sell the stock at will and thus terminate his obligation to
supply gas and oil to Motor Stage left the contract indefinite, so it
was argued, as to time. More importantly, the choice of performing
was completely within Fuchs' discretion. To the court the arrange-
ment was similar to an offer for a unilateral contract-the right to
revoke exists until performance consumates the deal. "Ordinarily
[reasoned the court in continuing to sustain the reading of mutuality
into the unilateral contract] such a contract would not be enforce-
able ... for lack of mutuality."69 The transaction was nevertheless
held to be enforceable because of what the court labeled "indepen-
dent or collateral" consideration-the seventy-five hundred dollars
paid by the plaintiff for Motor Stage's stock. To explain away the
need for mutuality an option analogy was invoked. "Under such
contracts, consideration is essential, but mutuality of obligation is
not."70
It was a complicated and labored reasoning process that the
court followed. And it could have been avoided had not mutuality
of obligation been considered sufficiently relevant to merit discus-
sion. What was clearly a requirements contract by every term of the
definition was cloaked with the accoutrements of an option, pre-
cipitating reliance on "independent" consideration. 71 It would have
of remedy and mutuality of obligation. See e.g., Richards v. Doyle, 36 Ohio St. 37
(1880); State v. Baum's Heirs, 6 Ohio 383 (1834); Wright v. Rand, 6 Ohio L. Abs.
741 (Ct. of App. 1928).
67 See Austin, supra note 43.
68 135 Ohio St. at 515, 21 N.E.2d at 673.
89 Id. at 519, 21 N.E.2d at 674.
70 Id.
71 Reliance on "independent consideration" is traceable to the decision by the
court of appeals (Muskingum County). The court conceded that requirements contracts
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been easier and far more logical to recognize that Fuchs' promise
was not illusory and that his freedom of action was restricted in two
ways. First, he had to meet the defendant's gas, oil and grease
demands. Secondly, if Fuchs wanted to get from under the burdens
of the arrangement, he would have had to give up his rights of
ownership in the defendant's business. Hence mutuality was, in fact,
present in the transaction. "[E]ach party is under a legal duty to
the other; each has made a promise and each is an obligor. '7 2 And
this reciprocity of obligation is not erased by a power of termination
in one of the parties.73
are not lacking in mutuality. "The mutual promises are held to create and fully sup-
port a valid and binding [requirements] contract." Brief of Appellant at 15, Fuchs v.
United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939). Unfortunately the
court was sidetracked by the defendant's contention "that Ohio cleaves to the adverse
rule, 'there must exist mutuality in a contract both of obligation and of remedy, before
such contract can be made the basis of a suit for specific performance', as is found
adopted in Steinau v. Gas Co., 48 O.S. 524...." Id. To get around the "adverse" rule
the court of appeals fastened on the purchase of $7,500 worth of defendant's stock by
the plaintiff, labeling it "executed consideration for future business." Id. at 16.
The court of appeals was boxing shadows; the "adverse" rule did not exist since
by the court's own admission mutuality is present in requirements contracts. Further-
more, the issue in Steinau was strictly mutuality of remedy-could the plaintiff obtain
specific performance of a requirements contract by enforcing a negative covenant? A
question answered in the negative because of the mutuality of remedy obstacle. See
Austin, supra note 43, at 635-37.
72 1A ComiN, supra note 2, § 152 at 4.
73 The mistaken notion that a right to cancel precludes mutuality also appeared
in Raleigh v. Yanko, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 347, 106 N.E.2d 567 (C.P. 1952). The plaintiff
union agreed to issue a union recognition card to the defendant restaurant who, in
turn, agreed to employ only members of the union. The plaintiff had sole property
rights to the card and could remove it at will. The court analyzed the agreement as
follows:
The union does not bind itself to do anything except that it acknowledges
the issuance of the union card. There is a total lack of mutuality. If binding
upon the employer, it is not binding at all upon the union. It is like a lease
which would attempt to bind the landlord but allow the tenant to terminate
the lease at will.
Id. at 353, 106 N.E.2d at 571.
There was, however, nothing illusory about the plaintiffs promise. The union
exchanged possession of the recognition card for a commitment by the defendant to
hire only union labor. If the union withdrew its card, the defendant's obligation to hire
only union labor would end. Of this type of contract Corbin says:
[T]he contract should not be regarded as unfair for its supposed lack of
'mutuality.' No court or 'writer has maintained that the validity of a contract
depends upon an objective equality of advantages or values. Each promise
made by one party does not have to be matched by an equivalent promise
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The validity of the requirements contract is now, via adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code, codified in Ohio.74 The pos-
sibility of attack on the grounds of indefiniteness is thus eliminated.
In addition, if the comment supporting the original U.C.C. section is
heeded, the mutuality problem disappears. The drafters of the Code
expressly recognized that the obligations of both parties are
reciprocal. 75
VIII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of mutuality of obligation is a viable concept in
Ohio jurisprudence. In some instances it appears as harmless sur-
plusage, almost as an afterthought. On other occasions mutuality has
appeared in the form of an out of context tautology. "That both
parties must be bound or neither is bound is true. .. . 76one court
irrelevantly remarked where the issue was the validity of acceptance.
In these situations it can be argued that invocation of mutuality is
relatively harmless-if it can ever be said that shoddy reasoning can
be harmless. But the line separating harmless surplusage from
dangerous confusion is fragile. It is submitted that the line is crossed
when mutuality is defined in terms of performance so as to explain
and justify the existence of a unilateral contract, or when the "test"
of mutuality is said to be the right of both parties to maintain an
action for damages. 77 It is equally untenable to make mutuality a
crucial factor in analysis of the option or to use it as apologia for
ferreting out an implied promise from the circumstances of a
transaction.
made by the other. Each right or power or privilege possessed by one party
does not have to have its exact counterpart in the other.
IA CoBiN § 161 at 68.
74 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.19 (Page 1964). See Note, Requirements Contracts
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 654 (1954).
75 Nor does such a contract lack mutuality of obligation since, under this sec-
tion, the party who will determine quantity is required to operate his plant or
conduct his business in good faith and according to commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade so that his output or requirements will approximate
a reasonably foreseeable figure.
UNIFORAT COMIERCIAL CODE § 2-306, comment 2.
76 Painter v. Brainard-Cedar Realty Co., 29 Ohio App. 123, 126, 163 N.E. 57, 58
(1928). A recent example of irrelevance is contained in Thomas G. Snavely Co. v.
Brown Const. Co., 239 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio C.P. 1968). At issue was the existence of a
creditor beneficiary contract. The court, with no explanation, invoked mutuality:
"Writings purporting to be contracts which lack substantial mutuality in obligation are
hardly contracts meriting great respect." Id. at 762.
77 Meier Grape Juice Co. v. Koehne, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 619 (Ct. App. 1925).
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The diverse forms" in which mutuality has 'been adapted and
molded to fit a myriad of transactional situations by the courts in
Ohio does not necessarily reflect the views of any single legal com-
mentator. Some of the decisions interpret mutuality, as Williston
did, as being synonymous with consideration. 78 On the other hand,
mutuality has been viewed as something above and beyond the
requirement of consideration. 9 The Fuchs decision apparently
adopted Corbin's thinking that as long as consideration is present,
mutuality is not needed. 0 Ohio courts have not, however, carried
Corbin's recommendation to its conclusion and completely dis-
carded the concept. And it is unlikely that they ever will.
The single factor that assures a position of endurance for
mutuality in the judicial vernacular is the multi-dimensional char-
acteristics that flow from the very word itself. What had originally
served as a guardian of symmetry for the age of classical contracts
gradually changed shape and assumed the proportions of a seman-
tical catch-all whose purpose is to serve as a verbal device that allows
the court to make sure that both parties receive that for which they
bargained."' Whether it is a question of the exchange of reciprocal
promises or performance as consideration, or whether the issue is
"mutuality of assent,"82 Ohio case law has imputed sufficient
elasticity into the word mutuality to cover each situation.
78 Stewart v. Herron, 77 Ohio St. 130, 82 N.E. 956 (1907); Fanning v. Insurance Co.,
37 Ohio St. 839 (1881); Dayton, Watervliet Valley and Xenia Turnpike Co. v. Coy,
13 Ohio St. 84 (1861); Congregation v. Kesmo Del, 82 Ohio App. 282 (1948); Bowers v.
Detroit Southern R.R. Co., 4 Ohio C.C.R. (ns.) 479 (1904).
79 Mutual Home S. Savings Ass'n v. Welker, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 42 N.E.2d 167
(1941).
80 In the text of the opinion the Court said:
The authorities are to the effect that so long as there is consideration for
the obligation of the defendant, it is not essential that there be mutuality of
obligation....
Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 515, 21 N.E2.d 669, 673 (1939).
This statement was diluted somewhat in the syllabus-which, in Ohio, contains
the law of the case.
So long as there is consideration for the obligation of one party to pur-
chase merchandise from another, it is not always essential that there be
mutuality of obligation .... (emphasis supplied)
Id. at 509, 21 N.E.2d at 669.
81 Professor Friedman analyzes the change in the role of mutuality in terms
of "a maturing economic system" and as a "definite rejection of values inherent in
classical contract law." L. FRmmAN, CoNTRACr LAw iN AmmucA 89 (1965).
82 The Ohio Supreme Court once said:
"[Tjhere being express assent to the terms of the contract by both parties, the
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In this sense it could be argued that mutuality of obligation has
evolved into what Julius Stone calls a "category of indeterminate
reference."8 13 Mutuality now possesses many of the properties of a
legal standard. As contrasted to rules, which are localized in content
and effect (e.g., "An offer which is too indefinite to create a con-
tract if verbally accepted, may, by entire or partial performance on
the part of the offeree, create a contract." 8 ), legal standards, operat-
ing with the mobility of abstraction, necessarily cover a wide range
of conflicts. Moreover, where a standard, i.e., category of indeter-
minate reference, controls, "judgment cannot turn on logical
formulations and deductions, but must include a decision as to
what justice requires in the context of the instant case."8 5 Viewed
in this context, the doctrine of mutuality would allow "a wide range
for variable judgment in interpretation and application, approaching
compulsion only at the limits of the range."8 16
Mutuality as a legal standard raises two important questions.
First, is it necessary to contract analysis? Would decision making be
more difficult in its absence? The answer to both questions is no.
The doctrine of consideration, itself arguably a form of indeter-
minate reference,8 7 completely occupies the area in which mutuality
normally makes its appearance. Hence to call upon mutuality can
only result in diluting effective application of rules of consideration.
Secondly, have courts been consistent in recognizing mutuality as a
legal standard? Again the answer is no. If anything, the survey of
decisions contained in this article demonstrates that Ohio courts
consider mutuality to be both standard and precise legal formula.
element of mutuality is not wanting." Railway Co. v. Cox, 55 Ohio St. 497, 516, 45
N.E. 641, 645 (1896).
83 J. SToNE, LEGAL SYSThr AND LAWyES' REASONINGS passim (1964) [hereinafter
cited at STONE].
84 RESTATEarENT OF CONTRACtS § 33 at 44 (1932).
Si STONE, supra note 83, at 263-64.
80 Id. at 264.
87 The elusive characteristics of the doctrine of consideration have been analyzed
by Corbin in the following terms:
"The present writer believes that there never was any specific and definite 'origin'
to be discovered, that no particular definition can (or ever could) be described as the
only 'correct' one, and that there has never been a simple and uniform 'doctrine' by
which enforceability can be deductively determined. Nevertheless, the use of the term
cannot be avoided; but, in making use of it, it is necessary to consider the purpose for
which it is used and to make sure that justice is not being defeated by using it in
accordance with some narrow and limited definition." 1 CoamN, supra note 2, § 109
at 487.
